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Chapter 8 – Analysing Discourse  
 
Martin Barker 
 
The seemingly inexorable rise of the concept of „discourse‟ has made it almost 
unavoidable for cultural studies researchers, particularly since its invitation to theorise 
culture as „like a language‟ coincides with so many impulses within our field.  But not 
without substantial costs.  Looking at the cultural studies field from my angle as an 
audience researcher, some troubling features within discourse work come into view.  
For all the multiplicity of approaches, and the attendant variations in attached modes 
of „discourse analysis‟, there are some powerful unifying features in „discourse talk‟; 
and these features presume the very things that as an audience researcher I have to 
question.  Very crudely, if the predominant theories of discourse are correct, my 
research field becomes „impossible‟.  There are embedded assumptions about the 
„powers‟ of discourses, about how discourses „work‟, which are powerfully disabling.  
There is a further problem, seemingly unrelated to the first, of the „convenient 
sample‟: that is, the choice of cases which suit a researcher‟s pre-given position and 
purpose, and which cannot allow a test of these.  How do researchers know what 
„texts‟ or bodies of materials to choose, for analysis?  To whom are they relevant 
other than to the analyst?  This too has dangerous entailments for the possibility of 
audience research.  It is time, in my view, to expose these assumptions and to 
unshackle discourse research from their influence. 
 
These issues have become particularly alive for me in the last four years, as I began 
with colleagues to plan for, conduct and assemble, and then analyse a vast body of 
materials within the international project on audience responses to the film of The 
Lord of the Rings.  This project, which is being published in a range of forms and 
places, has required us to find or develop very detailed methods of discourse analysis 
in order to bring into view the differing orientations of a great range of kinds of 
audiences in varying cultural and country contexts.  In this chapter I draw upon the 
insights I have gained, from being involved in these processes, without either directly 
addressing our detailed solutions or reporting any of the resultant findings.  For any 
who are interested, I have footnoted some of the main places where these can be 
found. 
 
The Growth of Discourse Work 
 
Over the last 30 years discourse theory and analysis have grown from a minor 
specialist area to one of the most pervasive and multifarious academic fields.  
WorldCat is the nearest we have to a complete database of all publications in the 
English language.  A simple search at five year intervals for book titles containing the 
word „discourse‟ suggests a steady rise to its current prominence: 
 
Table 1: 
English language book titles including the word “discourse”.  Source: WorldCat 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
70 144 157 327 360 449 651 762 616 
 
This accelerating growth across the period 1980-2000 is striking, albeit it may be 
stalling now.  But if we consider related journals, which emerge as a field 
consolidates and becomes organised, the picture becomes more complicated: 
 
Discourse (founded 1980) 
Discourse Processes (1981) 
Text: an Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of Discourse (1981) 
Discourse and Society (1990) 
Discourse Studies (1999) 
Discourse Analysis On-Line (2003) 
Critical Discourse Studies (2004) 
Journal of Multicultural Discourse (2006) 
 
The first „clump‟ of development marks the emergence of sociolinguistics, and of the 
cognitive sciences – but my suspicion is that these are only weakly related to the 
kinds of book publication then appearing.  In that period of accelerated book 
publication between 1975-85, a large number of the books derive from the crisis in 
academicist Marxism, and its replacement of „ideology‟ by „discourse‟.  The delay 
before the second round of journals emerges arises precisely from the fact that this 
was less a research tradition, than an expression of altered political concerns.  The 
„field‟ that emerges thus acquired some distinctive, peculiar qualities: 
 
 A considerable amount of renaming went on – in various parts of the field, from 
„ideology‟, or from „text‟, or from „structure of feeling‟, to „discourse‟; 
 This field is very self-aware, philosophically and epistemologically – it is not easy 
to work in it without entering fundamental debates about the relations between 
„discourses‟ and the non-discursive; 
 It is a field of contentions, with sharp and continuing clashes between, for 
instance, sociolinguists and conversation analysts on the one hand, and discourse 
theorists and critical discourse analysts on the other; 
 It is a field very concerned to be culturally and politically relevant yet deeply 
worried about its warranty for taking political positions. 
 
In fact we might characterise it as a motley domain, made up of scholars who 
probably cannot agree on any fundamental definitions, yet all of whom are drawn to 
certain questions, which are seen as of particular relevance today.  These questions 
concern the nature and role of language and other meaning-systems in the operation 
of social relations, and in particular the power of such systems to shape identities, 
social practices, relations between individuals, communities, and all kinds of 
authority.  And the reason for the centrality of this topic of power surely arises from 
the ways in which discourse work emerged from the collapse of academic Marxism, 
the rise of alternative social movements theorised by near-simultaneous academic 
constituencies, alongside the „cultural turn‟ in various fields of the social sciences. 
 
Just about every writer about discourse theory acknowledges the diversity within the 
field, although they may cut the cake differently.
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  Whilst acknowledging the helpful 
distinctions various authors have made, I have found it most useful to ask a series of 
questions of different kinds of discourse work.  This has led me to distinguish seven 
main tendencies
2
 and to tabulate their different answers to my questions as follows. 
 
Table 2: 
 
THEORIES OF 
DISCOURSE 
 
 
Saussurean 
Structuralism 
 
Lacanian Post-
structuralism 
 
Foucauldian 
Theory 
 
Rhetorical 
Psychology 
 
Conversation 
Analysis 
 
Critical 
Discourse 
Theory 
 
Volosinovian 
Dialogism 
 
What are its 
key founding 
claims? 
Language is an 
arbitrary system 
of differences 
The formation of 
language is the 
formation of 
gendered self 
Institutions 
construct their 
subjects as 
objects of 
knowledge 
Language is 
always a 
function of 
contexts of talk 
Spoken 
interaction is a 
complex 
achievement 
Linguistic forms 
are constitutive 
of ideological 
positions 
People use 
language to 
form groups & 
conduct social 
struggles 
 
What forms of 
language are 
seen as 
primary? 
 
Forms of 
classification, 
descriptive 
systems 
Constructions 
that relay and 
relate 'Self' and 
its many 
relations to  
'Others' 
Language 
embodying 
institutional 
processes and 
knowledge 
Ordinary talk 
embodying 
social 
arguments and 
beliefs 
 
Ordinary talk 
expressing 
patterns of 
exchange 
Embedded 
grammars 
expressing 
power/ 
ideological 
relations 
Shifts between 
linguistic 
struggle and 
conceptual 
sedimentation 
What is the 
main purpose/ 
function of 
speech in 
society? 
 
As samples of 
current 
synchronic 
structure 
To embody Self 
in its relation of 
Desire to Others 
To constitute 
subjects 
through 
institutions, 
shaping their 
responses 
 
To respond 
appropriately to 
social contexts 
 
To be and to 
embody 
complex social 
relations 
 
To fix or to 
challenge the 
fixity of linguistic 
codes 
To form and 
carry through 
social projects, 
and form 
communities 
How is 
linguistic and 
conceptual 
change 
explained? 
Secondarily, as 
a function of 
shifts in 
synchronic 
order 
With difficulty, 
mainly by 
'consciousness-
raising' 
techniques 
 
As a function of 
shifting 
institutional 
imperatives 
 
As social 
contexts change 
Change is the 
norm, fixity only 
relates to 
general speech 
patterns 
As a result of 
struggles 
between 
'langues' and 
'paroles' 
As an outcome 
of social 
struggles, 
emergent 
communities 
 
How is 
language 
related to 
thought? 
 
Language is 
thought, virtually 
 
Language is 
identity/ies, 
virtually 
Language is 
related to 
regimes of truth 
which measure 
thought 
Language is 
determined by 
public contexts 
and knowable, 
thought is un-
researchable 
Language is the 
'front-end' of 
back-region 
unseeable 
processes 
 
Language 
shapes and 
'determines' 
thought 
People orient to 
languages, 
actions provoke 
us to check 
them by critical 
thought 
 
How is 'power' 
in language 
conceptual-
ised? 
 
As a direct 
function of 
structures, 
'langue' 
precedes parole 
Language is a 
function of 
desire which 
powerfully 
constructs the 
world and 
identities 
As a function of 
regimes of truth, 
constituting 
forms of 
resistance also 
 
'Contexts', both 
lived and 
ideological, are 
powerful 
 
Power is over 
the situation of 
talk, directing 
the flow of 
exchanges 
As embedded 
grammars 
which remain 
unexposed, 
hence 
unchallenged 
As persuasion 
in real 
situations, 
tactical control 
of concepts and 
exchanges 
What can 
discourse 
analysis 
reveal, and 
what can it 
prove? 
Reveal 
synchronic 
systems ( their 
power is already 
'known') 
Reveal the 
operation of 
gendered 
constructions 
(their power is 
already 'known') 
Reveal 
institutions at 
work (their 
existence is 
already 'known') 
Reveal 
contextual/ 
ideological 
determinants, 
and strategies 
of response 
Reveal how 
people manage 
their social 
interactions, 
proving little 
beyond that 
Reveal social/ 
ideological 
grammars (their 
power is already 
'known') 
Reveal new 
aspects of 
processes and 
terms of 
struggles, and 
how people 
orient to them 
Exemplars 
of each 
approach's 
ways of 
analysing 
John Hartley, 
Approaches to 
News, Judith 
Williamson, 
Decoding 
Advertisements 
 
Frank Burton & 
Pat Carlen, 
Official 
Discourse 
 
John Tagg, The 
Burden of 
Representation, 
Stephen Heath, 
The Sexual Fix 
Jonathan Potter 
& Margaret 
Wetherell, 
Discourse and 
Social 
Psychology 
 
Charles Antaki, 
Analysing 
Everyday 
Explanation 
Gunther Kress 
& Tony Trew, 
'Ideological 
dimensions of 
discourse' 
Marc Steinberg, 
Fighting Words; 
Chik Collins, 
'To concede or 
contest?' 
 
This way of thinking the field has at least two advantages.  First, it addresses the 
relations between definitions of discourse, their ontological and epistemological 
assumptions, and the associated questions and methods.  Second, it brings in the one 
approach that other accounts tend to leave out – that deriving distinctively from the 
work of Valentin Volosinov.  Work deriving from Volosinov still considers issues of 
power to be crucial, but because of its general theorisation of language, the nature of 
that power has to be considered an empirical question. 
 
By contrast, and with the one exception of Conversation Analysis, the other strands 
tend to treat „power‟ as the central „given‟ of discourse.3  It is this I wish to address.  
But rather than address this purely at the level of theory and definitions, I prefer to 
look in detail at actual examples of discourse analysis.  For this purpose, I have 
chosen two books as test-cases. 
 
(1) Chris Barker & Dariusz Galasiński, Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis 
(2001). 
 
Barker and Galasiński offer a useful test-case.  Their book is, if you will, a manifesto, 
urging upon cultural studies scholars the benefits of complementing a presumed-to-
be-agreed set of theoretical positions, with methods for close empirical analysis of 
cultural materials.
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  The recommended method is critical discourse analysis.  But 
these methods will not test any of the core theoretical claims – these are „known‟ on 
other grounds.  They include a range of philosophical positions (about self and 
identity, about the nature and role of language in society, and about the wish for 
cultural studies to „give voice‟ to disadvantaged and silenced groups), and which 
derive from a pantheon of recognised theorists (Saussure, Pierce, Wittgenstein, 
Barthes, Hall, Foucault, Lacan, Butler, etc).  The role of methods is limited, it seems, 
to detailed illustration.  The rest is „interpretations‟, which are essentially a matter of 
position. 
 
At the heart of the authors‟ approach is a stance that I would want to challenge, as 
either endlessly ambiguous or just plain wrong, a stance which is captured in their 
summative acceptance of the „argument that language is constitutive of subjectivity, 
identify and our cultural maps of meaning‟ (p.47).  There are many issues buried in 
here, but the one which concerns me here is the deterministic language.  Throughout 
the book it is possible to find repeated instances of words assuming specific kinds of 
causal relations at work within culture: people are apparently „constructed‟, 
„impelled‟, „constituted‟, „interpellated‟, and so on.  The book‟s first three chapters 
lay out what the authors regard as this „agreed territory‟, followed by an account of 
critical discourse analysis, and then some extended applications to a CIA document; 
to some interviews with men about fatherhood, and with elderly Poles about their 
attitudes to Ukrainians.  For the sake of focus, I look at their first example. 
 
Over fourteen pages, they scrutinise a Credo posted on the CIA‟s own website, using 
various CDA tests for social grammars (in particular focusing on the recurrent use of 
„we‟, and the self-attributions this implies).  This scrutiny unquestionably leads to a 
richer description of the document.  But then comes a claim which goes beyond 
description.  Here is what they say: 
 
Let us take a look at the thematic and information structure of the CIA 
Credo, beginning with the first sentence: “We are the Central Intelligence 
Agency”.  As we pointed out earlier, the theme of the clause is the recurrent 
„we‟.  However, unless we can actually see a group of people, we cannot 
simply accept the „we‟ as given.  Who, we might ask, are the people saying 
this?  There is no way to tell.  So why not start by saying „this is the Credo 
of the Central Intelligence Agency‟.  The answer lies precisely in the given 
status of the theme. The text proposes that we, the readers of the text, know 
who is talking.  This is a strategy quite consistent with opening a Web site 
and working on an image of legitimacy, law-abidance, and transparency.  
What follows from this is an interesting exercise in locating the CIA as the 
given of the text and the rest as the new.  In other words, the CIA assumes 
that its audience knows merely of its existence and nothing about what it 
does.  This is a fascinating finding when one considers that the Credo, like 
other corporate texts, is displayed for public consumption on the Internet.  
Yet, we would speculate that this apparent glitch in the form of the Credo is 
probably well worth it.  Thanks to it, the CIA not only establishes itself as a 
known, taken-for-granted part of American life, but presents itself as a unity 
defending American values.  The average American can sleep peacefully 
knowing that the CIA is out there making sure that American interests are 
well-served. (2001: 83) 
 
There are several problems with this account, and its implicit moves.  The most 
obvious is the slipped-in rhetoric of this „average American‟ who appears to be 
someone who can be „spoken‟ to by the CIA.  An abstract figure, what qualities might 
s/he have?  And what is it that makes her/him so open to being constituted into 
comfort by this document?  It is not just that we do not know, but there is no interest 
in finding out.  This aside, other implicit assumptions underpin this move.  The most 
troublesome are these.  It seems that the capacity to be affected by these discursive 
elements is a function of a motiveless encounter.  The reader is not looking at this web 
document for any reason, or with any purpose – they are just looking.  It also seems 
that they have never before seen a document of this kind.  If they had, generic 
knowledge that „this looks like one of those Mission Statements‟ might kick in, 
making otiose the distinction which is vital to their move: that „we‟ might only know 
of the CIA‟s existence but know nothing of its nature.  If we recognise this as a 
Mission Statement, we probably know something about the rhetorical functions of 
such Statements, and a number of things about the kinds of organisation that produce 
them. 
 
This example not only illustrates just how deeply embedded are these moves and 
implications.  It also suggests that they gain their persuasiveness because they are 
backed by those wider philosophical position-takes.  Discourse analysis naturally 
generates „images of the audience‟ which require no testing.  Let‟s see how this works 
in a more determinedly „empirical‟ book. 
 
(2) Carla Willig (ed.), Applied Discourse Analysis (1999). 
 
Willig‟s collection is an example of the best that critical discourse analysis offers to 
cultural studies.  I don‟t mean that cynically.  The book contains much that is very 
valuable and instructive.  Even so, each of its essays reveals blind-spots.  In her 
introduction, Willig is acutely aware of the many epistemological and political 
problems of „applying‟ discourse analysis to live problems. But two things are 
strikingly missing from her worries: any examination of the issue of the „power‟ 
claims in discourse theory; and any consideration of how the truth-claims of discourse 
analyses might be tested.  These absences re-emerge in the essays, which I want to 
examine
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.  I spend longer on the first, only because close attention to that saves time 
on the remainder. 
 
Steven D Brown explores the discursive organisation of self-help books – the kind 
that tell you how to cope better with stress, and to make the most of yourself, 
especially at work.  He asks: „how do these texts exert their effects?‟ (24).  He notes 
their near-didactic organisation, their constant „prompts, suggestions, encouragement‟ 
(23) to examining yourself, seeing stress as something to be addressed within yourself 
(as against, for instance, challenging stressful working environments).  This leads to 
him locating an idea of a „serviceable self‟, a managed production of oneself that will 
cope, be flexible and productive, and have a sense of self-worth from achieving this.  
But all the way through the essay, the analysis of the books is accompanied by an 
unanalysed figure.  „The reader‟ enters at the moment when s/he opens one of these 
books, after purchase: „Let us leave aside for a moment what motivates people to buy 
or read a self-help book about stress.  Consider instead what happens as they work 
through the text.‟ (23)  Thereafter this figure gradually accretes attributions.  Some 
are soft and casual: regimes are „presented to the reader‟ (35, no implications of 
response); the books „encourage readers to develop a particular relationship with 
themselves‟ (37, slight implications).  Others slide further: „The reader must accept 
the serious nature of the choices that he or she is making …‟ (31); „the use of devices 
such as heat serve to make stress visible in a way that is immediately explicable to the 
reader‟ (32); „computational metaphors … impress on the reader the importance of 
understanding mental operations during stress …‟ (34 – with the curious implication 
in the last two that these rhetorical resources are evidently effective, a claim I find 
curious to say the least).  This is perhaps Brown‟s strongest version:  
 
A grand gesture of extending wisdom and guidance is played out.  The reader 
must further accept the serious nature of the choice he or she is making, and that 
this involves assuming an active role: „This is not a book for hypochondriacs.  It is 
for people who enjoy being healthy and are prepared to help themselves to remain 
healthy‟ (Eagle, 1982: 6).  The work of staying healthy is purely a matter of 
personal responsibility.  The texts offer help, but on the proviso that readers fully 
accept that the problem lies within themselves. (31) 
 
Thenceforth, this „reader‟ becomes increasingly a textual construct, an „addressed‟ 
and „positioned‟ empty figure –only becoming nearly three-dimensional in the closing 
paragraphs, where Brown asks: „Clearly we need to understand just how this 
transformation then plays out when it becomes an accepted feature of labour 
relations‟. (38)  But notice how readers‟ motivations, and uses of the books, have now 
been subsumed within a disciplinary model: they meet these books within the context 
of labour relations.  Indeed he makes the curious assumption that those most likely to 
read these books are the victims of such work environments, rather than (as I suspect) 
their managers, trainers, supervisors.  The books‟ „power‟ is thereby virtually 
guaranteed.  Thus Brown‟s safety clause („Readers do what they will with them‟ (40)) 
becomes a rhetorical closure, instead of an invitation to possible testing research.  
And that to me is the real issue. 
 
Let me summarise the problems I am pointing to.  Brown‟s interpretation of these 
books only works if we share certain premises with him.  (1)  Premises concerning 
unity and coherence: he is forming them into a genre, assuming that the average 
„reader‟ will receive them as working and meaning in the same way.  That makes two 
further assumptions: (a) it assumes that readers will not see important distinctions 
among them – perhaps in style, or in applicability of metaphors, examples, and 
regimes – and thus generate their own genres, responding to some and perhaps 
rejecting others.  (b) It assumes that there will thus be cumulative influence: „[t]he 
more readers begin to revise their grasp of their personal circumstances in terms of 
stress‟ (24), the more they will be „positioned‟.  Treating them as unified allows 
Brown to claim a „discourse‟, and thence to presume without evidence their „power‟.  
(2) Premises concerning persuasiveness: he has presumed on the effectiveness of 
their rhetorical organisation.  For example he writes that „it is the very vacuousness of 
the terms stress and energy which makes the mixing up of these discourses possible‟ 
(37). That permits him to move to arguing that this emptiness allows the books to be 
„all things to all people‟.  The assumption here is that what he as discourse analyst can 
see as vacuous, not only is not visible to „readers‟, its invisibility is the very ground of 
their incorporation.  Thus, discourse analysis perversely builds in a presumption of the 
effectivity of the patterns it „discloses‟.  (3) Premises concerning investigative 
completeness and testability: all these are posed in ways which hide the possibility of 
testing.  The implications are there, but are never sign-posted.  They remain half-
buried, with the protective stricture that this is „only an interpretation‟.  This for me 
points to two further sub-questions: (a) the issue of researchers‟ responsibility for 
consequences and implications of their strong claims.  It cannot be right that at the 
first point of critical enquiry an analyst is entitled to say „This is only an 
interpretation, you are pushing my account too far‟.  That would lead to the most 
sterile form of relativism imaginable.  (b) A further assumption, less evident in this 
case but vital later, is that his own method of analysing the books is trustworthy.  Of 
course, the essay format makes it hard to demonstrate methods in depth.  But that 
cannot remove the questions involved here: what larger investigation of their 
meaning-making processes underlies his presentation?  What guided his list-making, 
and how complete was this?  Has Brown examined the books rigorously, in the sense 
of attending to their overall organisation and direction, rather than lifting for quotation 
favoured but marginal elements?  Has he examined differences as well as similarities 
within his „genre‟?  All these have to be taken on trust in a way that they would not be 
in more „conventional‟ modes of research. 
 
These issues are replicated, albeit with differences, in other essays.  Timothy Auburn, 
Susan Lea and Susan Drake offer an account of the discursive practices at work in 
police interviews.  They look in particular at moments of explanatory disjuncture, 
when an interrogator points to discrepancies in a suspect‟s account, and demands they 
account for these.  Using recorded interviews, they draw attention to a series of 
rhetorical devices used by the police – such as urging suspects to be honest with 
themselves, or to see how another person would look at their account, or to think how 
an expert would evaluate their explanation. From this they develop an account of the 
police interview as the discursive work of producing an administrative knowledge of 
the events; and suggest that discourse analysts should „take sides‟ by teaching this 
kind of understanding to groups (gays, mental health advocates, trade unionists) who 
suffer regular harassment by the police.  All this is interesting, but the revealing „slip‟ 
comes when they sum up a police line of questioning as follows: 
 
This concern about the lack of intersubjective agreement on „what really 
happened‟ is warranted by a particular selection of features of the event which 
give rise to inferences that there are discrepancies between the two available 
accounts.  The production of a discrepancy in turn relies upon carefully crafted 
fact constructions so that the discrepancy becomes a plausible inference from the 
selection and meaning of the „facts‟ as part of a wider narrative of the events. (54) 
 
Pause on this.  Just what would a „carelessly crafted‟ or „implausible‟ version look 
like?  Is there any way in which, for discourse analyses of this kind, rhetorical moves 
can fail?  I do not think they can, because these accounts assume the productive 
coherence (as against the tactical, and contestable nature) of official discourses.  (It is 
interesting that the extract which precedes and leads to the above quote ends with the 
suspect simply repeating „No I didn‟t do it‟.) 
 
Val Gillies explores women smokers‟ argumentative strategies for not giving up in the 
face of their acceptance of health arguments about smoking.  Using quotes from four 
women, she draws attention to the way they talk about „addiction‟.  This is a 
discourse, she argues, whose „most powerful effect … is to provide a deterministic 
explanation that emphasises the smoker‟s lack of control over her actions‟ (71).  This 
couples with her talk of discourses such as „addiction‟ as „containing‟ and 
„positioning‟ individuals.  Their use of these languages shows they are victims 
because of their discursive domination.  However with one woman at least, „Mary‟, 
she notes that „addiction‟ is only one among a number of other strategies.  Mary also 
says she is „not as bad as some others‟, is „able to say no‟ if offered a cigarette, and 
„isn‟t bothered if people ask her not to smoke‟.  All this might be seen to suggest that 
Mary is not „positioned‟ by these languages, but is calling – almost at random, and 
certainly without adherence – on a range of discursive resources, and it does not 
matter to her that they might be seen as incoherent and contradictory.  But Gillies 
does not go this way; instead, she takes from Mary a passing reference to a „gradual 
brainwashing thing‟ to reassert that Mary has absorbed and been constructed as victim 
by a discourse of „lack of control over herself‟ (74).  This allows Gillies to go to 
examples of Health Education literature in which, she argues, there is a „prevalence of 
a discourse of addiction‟ (81), and even beyond that to much wider „concepts of self-
control and restraint‟ (82) within which the discourse of addiction then finds a home.  
Mary‟s references to addiction thus become symptoms of discourses located by other 
means.  But we do not know, and apparently do not need to know, if Mary has ever 
encountered – let alone absorbed – any of these wider discourses.  This brings into 
focus what it means to identify a „discourse‟.  What standards of evidence are 
required to „name‟ something as a coherent, effective discourse?  And what standards 
then apply to knowledge about people‟s encounters with those, sufficient to count as 
having been „positioned‟ by them?  That, of course, is among the tasks that audience 
research has set itself. 
 
Willig‟s own essay presents some outcomes of a larger project on the discourses of 
safe sex.  Drawing upon interviews with heterosexual men and women, she identifies 
a series of discursive frames which they use to explain how they make or perhaps 
would make decisions about „safety‟.  These include: marital safety („I wouldn‟t be 
with him/her if I didn‟t trust them‟); trust („it would be very hurtful to suggest I don‟t 
trust her‟); and problems of interrupting a romantic encounter at a critical moment.  
She also identifies the devices that people use to distinguish „innocent victims‟ of 
STDs from other people. 
 
Willig opens by counterposing a discourse analytic approach to conventional social 
cognition approaches, concluding with these comments: „Social cognition models 
have received limited empirical support.  They can account for up to 50 per cent of 
the variance in declared intentions to adopt health behaviours but only control up to 
20 percent of variance in actual behaviour‟. (112)  This is an apt and perfectly valid 
criticism of social cognition approaches, and it references the long tradition of 
research into the gaps between people‟s declared attitudes and their behaviour. What 
is striking is the absence of any wish to mount equivalent tests of a discourse 
approach.  Why?  After all, in theory, discourse theory has a distinction quite closely 
matching that between attitudes and actions.  In the book‟s introduction, Willig 
distinguishes two regions of discourse work: the investigation of discursive practices 
and of discursive resources.
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  Discursive practices are the „local‟ communicative 
regimes which individuals and groups use, in ordinary communication.  Discursive 
resources, on the other hand, are more widely distributed.  Because of this, they are 
more obviously researchers‟ constructs, but still make strong claims on reality in that 
we try to understand local discursive practices through them. 
 
There is nothing wrong with this double articulation, providing it remains double, and 
thus open to tests. But in Willig‟s research the distinction collapses.  Having 
discovered that her respondents use these explanatory frames, she concludes that they 
are „predominantly disempowered‟ by them: „The marital discourse positioned 
spouses as safe by definition, which meant that talk about sexual safety constituted a 
challenge to the nature of the relationship itself.  Those who position themselves 
within this discourse are required to take sexual risks with their partner in order to 
negotiate a trusting relationship‟. (118)  First there is that slippage between apparent 
choice („position themselves‟) and apparent domination („positioned‟).  But then there 
is the fact is that this argument elides the very distinction which Willig insisted on 
earlier in relation to social cognition approaches: between intention and action; 
between talk and behaviour.  In the absence of other kinds of testing investigation, we 
simply don‟t know how far, or for whom, this kind of talk might be disempowering.  
One could well imagine a process of management if someone was nervous, in which 
another discourse – say, about contraception – could allow trust to be made 
compatible with safety.  In other words, Willig is assuming a complete congruence 
between her interviewees‟ „local‟ talk (discursive practice) and a wider discourse.  I 
wonder what „proportion of variance‟ she sees herself as explaining … 
 
The final essay raises a different dimension of my problems with discourse analysis. 
David Harper presents some selected aspects of his larger doctoral study on the 
discursive processes involved in establishing and then evaluating drug therapies of 
mental illness.  It is important to note in this case that we have here only a very small 
part of a larger study.  Harper bases his investigation on interviews with a mix of 
psychiatric professionals and users of their services.  He first lists a range of 
explanations offered by professionals to account for failures of drug regimes, and 
identifies within the talk that proposes these a body of „symptom-talk‟ which thereby 
engenders a structured distinction between „surface‟ phenomena and „underlying‟ 
pathology.  Everything thereafter turns on one medium-sized quotation from a 
consultant psychiatrist, „Dr Lloyd‟. 
 
Lloyd appears to offer several distinct explanations why a drug regime failed to alter 
the belief systems of a psychotic patient.  Harper teases out these explanations, 
showing how they in turn reference „sociological, behavioural, cognitive, personality 
and biological psychiatry‟, all the time surrounded by „fluid‟ cautions and 
qualifications. (134)  As an explanation this fails, he argues, because nothing could 
refute it.  But it does work to sustain Lloyd‟s expertise: „The extract warrants the 
continued use of medication here despite there being no change in psychotic 
symptoms‟. (136)  The remainder of the essay moves between drawing out 
implications for courses of action that could be adopted by various interest groups; 
and a self-reflexive angst over claiming his account as „true‟, and thus empiricist. 
 
My concerns are partly theoretical, partly tactical, but driven by one question: why 
should we trust his „reading‟ of Lloyd‟s account?  Theoretically, his cautions against 
„truth‟ largely let him off the hook, and the essay format colludes with this.  We have 
no grounds for determining what will count as a completed analysis.  One of the 
features of expertise is that not everything that is believed or known can be said 
explicitly at one point. So, what else indeed did Lloyd say in the interview?  The use 
of that single quoted paragraph may have denied him reasonable space to make sense.  
What could have made his account less „fluid‟?   This points up a problem for us as 
analysts: what can we responsibly do, in setting up and carrying out interviews and in 
analysing and presenting them, that will make our accounts of them fair, and will 
enable readers to assess them? 
 
I‟ve tried to delineate a number of issues with discourse analysis that emerge through 
the practices of these writers.  They can be summarised as follows: 
 
(1) The problem of the unity and coherence of the ‘research object’, leading on 
to (a) the problem of readers’ genres, and (b) implicit claims of cumulative 
influence. 
(2) Presumptions about persuasiveness and associated concepts of power. 
(3) Issues of investigative completeness and testability, leading on to (a) 
researchers‟ responsibility for their claims‟ implications, and (b) visibly 
trustworthy methods of analysis.   
 
Challenging the ‘power’ of discourse. 
 
How might we go about remedying these problems?   There is first, I think, a question 
of attitudes.  The simple excitement that many discourse theorists have felt at the 
emergence of their field, thence its tendency to intellectual imperialism, need now to 
be tempered.  Discourse theory does not explain the world, it helps us to understand 
parts of it.  And it is the relations between those parts and the rest, that is at stake 
here.  It will mean, therefore, being a bit more modest and sensible than has always 
been the case. Take this opening sentence: 
 
Language organised into discourses (what some contributors here call 
interpretative repertoires) has an immense power to shape the way that people, 
including psychologists, experience and behave in the world.  (Burman & Parker, 
1993: 1) 
 
Really?  Immense power over which people? When and where, precisely?  Under 
what circumstances?  With what determinable and checkable outcomes?  Researchers 
should back off from this kind of talk, and take some responsibility for spelling out 
how such claims might be tested.  To challenge this kind of talk is not to attempt to 
rubbish all the work that has gone on under such inflated circumstances.  It is to ask 
that discourse researchers – as indeed any other kind of qualitative researcher – 
consider why anyone should trust them.  Why should any reader trust their selection 
of materials for analysis, their mode of analysis, and the ways in which they draw 
conclusions from those?  The notion of „trustworthiness‟ is, for me, the qualitative 
researcher‟s equivalent of quantitative researchers‟ „triad‟ of validity, reliability and 
generalisability.   
 
But to avoid „trustworthiness‟ becoming simply a rhetorical claim, we require a set of 
distinct of principles, properly following which will enhance the strength that 
discourse work can claim.  Each of the following is intended to be an answer to the 
problems I have enunciated above: 
 
1.  The defensible corpus: in all kinds of quantitative research, the issue of the 
reliable sample is a first consideration.  In qualitative research the principles cannot be 
anything like the same, but that does not excuse us from having good grounds for our 
selections.  I propose to call the bounded group of items a qualitative researcher 
studies her/his „corpus‟, in order to mark this off from the quantitative researcher‟s 
„sample‟.  I would argue that a corpus should be subject to various tests which amount 
to measures of the analysis‟ trustworthiness.  In selecting a corpus for analysis, I 
propose that to the extent that there are defensible grounds for its selection, this alone 
adds to the stature of the analysis.  So what are such defensible grounds? 
 
Suppose a discourse researcher chooses to study a TV interview with a famous person 
(there are a number of examples of such analyses).  On convenience grounds, this is 
attractive.  The materials are nicely bounded, were produced and distributed 
independently of the analyst, and were (presumably) seen by a large number of 
people.  But choice for convenience alone must increase the provisionality of any 
claims.   
 
Take an interestingly complicated example: Abigail Locke and Derek Edwards (2003) 
analysed the Grand Jury cross-examination of Bill Clinton during the „Lewinsky 
Affair‟.  They are particularly interested in the ways in which Clinton defended his 
own position by attributing emotional insecurity to Lewinsky.  This apportioned some 
of the blame, and thereby exonerated himself.  It might seem that the focal, indeed 
televised, nature of the cross-examination guarantees the value of this corpus.  And 
indeed at one level it surely does.  But at another, it remains problematic – because 
they impose their own framework of relevance on it.  Most of the essay is a close 
analysis of particular attributions, but here is how they close their account: 
“Lewinsky‟s disposition towards irrationality and heightened emotions … provided 
the basis for various alternative accounts he was able to offer, of key and 
controversial events and readings of events.  Rather than exploiting a young and 
vulnerable White House intern, and persuading her to lie under oath, he was helping 
and counselling an emotionally vulnerable friend with whom he had responsibly 
ended some regrettably „inappropriate contact‟.  .. Clinton‟s accounts of interactions 
with Lewinsky worked to soften or rebut any notions of perjury and exploitation ...” 
(2003: 253-4)  This notion of the „work‟ Clinton‟s talk achieved, made visible by their 
alternative account of what might have been said instead, raises their description to 
the level of significance.  But at a price.  Missing, is any sense of the questions asked, 
and of this being a Grand Jury investigation.  Here was a piece of theatre, where both 
attackers and defenders shared an interest – in not harming the status of the 
Presidency per se.  Clinton‟s line of defence, I would argue, is made possible by the 
inquisition‟s institutional context.  Whether they or I am right or wrong, depends upon 
a wider contextual knowledge – and that is just my point. 
 
If there is independent evidence of the cultural importance of a corpus – which needs 
to identify to whom and under what circumstances it was important – to that extent 
the analyst has two advantages: s/he will already have a sense, from knowledge of the 
nature of the people concerned, of what aspects may be most relevant to attend to; and 
s/he will have the strongest grounds for the relevance of the outcomes of the analysis. 
 
2.  The defensible method: qualitative (therefore including discourse) methods 
always suffer from the difficulty that they are harder for other analysts to check.  
Many things contribute to this.  Pressures of time, the virtual disappearance of the 
monograph, increasing disciplinary specialisation: all contribute to a tendency to 
produce smaller, more enclosed pieces of research.  Journals impose tight word limits, 
and that restricts how far authors can make plain their methods of using their 
materials.  (Actually, there are solutions – web journals need not restrain length, and 
can include subjunctive pages, and it is not inconceivable for an author to point in any 
publication to a personal webspace which could display more fully the elaborated 
methods of analysis.)  This pulls us in two directions.  In one direction, with a very 
small corpus, it is possible to show more detail of the materials, and to show the 
methods of analysis in action; but it carries the higher risk of „privileged choice‟ – 
that is, favouring cases which suit a conclusion reached on other grounds.  But in the 
other direction a larger corpus is harder to display, and therefore the methods used to 
examine it tend to greater opacity.  My argument is this: the conveniently small 
corpus is at great risk of never being more than illustrative.  In the act of becoming 
more than this, it inevitably grows.  We have to face and find solutions to the 
problems of managing (both analytically and presentationally) large bodies of 
discursive materials. 
 
Consider a possible study.  From time to time, in any culture, certain expressions rise 
up (often, interestingly, out of fictional contexts) to encapsulate attitudes and 
relationships.
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  Some examples: „Gizza job‟ (out of Boys from the Black Stuff); 
„Loadsamoney!‟ (from Harry Enfield‟s popular-Thatcherite); „You might well say 
that, I couldn‟t possibly comment‟ (from House of Cards), „We wantses it, my 
preciousssss‟ (Gollum in The Lord of the Rings).  These have the great virtue that we 
know – we will have chosen them for consideration – because they have such high 
salience.  And a great deal can be said, discursively, about these, in all their 
minimalism.  Their very pithiness itself is in fact an important consideration.  But an 
analysis of any such epithets that did not tackle the variety of contexts of use would 
not pass beyond the illustrative. We learn much more if we can also consider who 
uses them in what ways, and with what evaluative accents – indeed, with what bodily 
expressions they were associated (by turns, mock head-butt; loud money-brandishing; 
suave pseudo-diffidence; ingratiating sneakiness).
8
  Such a broader analysis could 
disclose how apt such an expression is to incorporation into wider discursive 
constructions and debates, and that is precisely the point.  But then, from having 
begun with some of the smallest and most enclosed corpuses conceivable, in order to 
achieve significance we have to expand them greatly.  We are forced back to tackling 
the problems of the „inconvenient‟ corpus!  How do we manage the analysis of a large 
set of materials, and then present them satisfactorily? 
 
Of course particular fields within discourse research have strict and shared procedures 
for presenting samples of talk, particularly transcription rules.  These mainly govern 
the stages prior to analysis.   
 
3.  Taking responsibility for implied claims:  it is arguable (I would argue it) that all 
analyses of texts and discourses will inevitably make some substantive claims about 
things beyond themselves.  Most typically, these are claims about reception.
9
  Who 
are the „people‟ who will receive the discursively organised „messages‟ which the 
analyst has disclosed, and what is the possible impact of these?  „People‟ here needs 
to be in quote-marks, since – again, perhaps inevitably – our analyses use „figures of 
the audience‟. We do not name actual people (individuals or groups) but more likely 
kinds of people.  The moment we move beyond the loosest and least satisfactory use 
of terms like „the audience‟, or „the spectator‟, we begin to impute characteristics to 
them.  The difficulty is that these imputations are simultaneously pseudo-empirical, 
and theoretically-charged.  An example to explain what I mean. 
 
Michael Stubbs (1996) has recently proffered a new way of doing discourse analysis, 
which exploits the power of modern computers to permit the comparison of 
grammatical forms with vast datasets and thus disclose patterns and regularities, and 
offers interesting examples of what the method can achieve.   In one chapter, he 
explores and compares two final messages from Robert Baden-Powell, one to the 
Scouts, the other to the Guides.  Drawing on a corpus analysis of the two messages, 
he has valuable things to say about the ways in which the grammar of the two letters 
embodies, among other things, sexist ideas about the separate roles of men and 
women (and the ways in which these can be embedded in, for instance, talk about 
„happiness‟, which might at first sight appear gender-neutral).  But then he has this to 
say about how the Guides might have responded to the inherent sexism of BP‟s 
message to them:  
 
They express, quite explicitly, the view that women and men have very different 
places in the world, and many aspects of these views would now appear deeply 
objectionable, or perhaps just ridiculous, to many people.  Their tone strikes us, 
over fifty years on, as patronizing and naïve.  And there is no reason to suppose 
that Girl Guides down the years have passively absorbed BP‟s message.  They 
may have actively contested it, given it subversive readings, laughed at or just 
ignored it.  There is no direct way to investigate this, although one indication is 
that the Guides text has long been out of print. (1996: 84).   
 
Notice in here two linked tendencies.  (1) The salient feature is gender.  That may 
sound unproblematic, until we consider that it is also only gender.  This is not middle-
class girls and boys in the UK in early 20
th
 century conditions, in the sphere of leisure 
relations; it is just „girls‟ and „boys‟.  And the address of the messages is thus 
presumed to be „about‟ gender as such.  That might not matter in itself, since Stubbs 
might argue that his gender-analysis could be extended and supplemented by attention 
to class (for instance, what vocabularies are assumed?  What modes of „official 
speech‟ are used, and so on?), except that the theoretical stance of this argument has 
already taken us further.  (2) What we see here strongly recalls Stuart Hall‟s 
encoding/decoding model.  It begins by measuring the corpus against our concerns.  
So, first we determine that the messages are „sexist‟.  That already carries an 
implication.  If a reader were to have a passive encounter with these messages, they 
might well be „inscribed‟ into a damaging self-definition.  Of course, if they „actively‟ 
resisted or negotiated or took the piss, that safely distances them.  It is curious how 
this model of activity/passivity, despite frequent critiques, persistently inheres in 
models of this kind.   
 
I would argue the case differently.  In the range of options open to middle-class 
women at that time, Baden-Powell‟s communication could well have counted as a 
radical one.  Here they were, being addressed in their own right.  They had a role, and 
one demanding conscious attention and work – all contributing to a feeling that this 
was a positive rather than a demeaning message.  And from other historical researches 
we know that women could actively collaborate in promulgating (what we might see 
as) „sexist‟ definitions of themselves (see for instance Women in the Third Reich).  
Stubbs‟ analysis is thus compromised by his model.   
 
These, then, are my proposals for reforming the use of discourse analysis within 
cultural studies.  It should come as no surprise to realise that in essence I am arguing 
that discourse work needs always to be conducted within an explicit recognition that 
talk of all kinds arises within the circuit of culture.  The recognition of that circuit, 
embracing history, production practices, textual form, reception and recirculation, is 
one of the great achievements of cultural studies.
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  None of this means that only 
projects which achieve all the above are worth doing.  Rather, I am arguing for being 
honest about limits and boundaries.  Discourse work, like any other worthwhile 
research, is strong to the extent that it recognises its inevitable inclusion of implicative 
claims, which it cannot itself test.  It must therefore acknowledge the provisional 
nature of its findings but try to articulate what might take matters further. 
 
A Very Brief Example 
 
Although this example from work I have been personally involved in is very brief, 
you will be able to see, I hope, how it follows the principles I have laid out.  I would 
want to stress that this is one way, but only one among many, to observe these. 
 
The Lord of the Rings international audience project was precisely designed to test 
some of the kinds of claims that circulate in both academic and public spheres, about 
how audiences might relate to, and be affected by, a film such as this: an enormously 
successful fantasy trilogy, based upon a very English story, while trumpeting its New 
Zealand production and settings, and yet made with Hollywood studio money.  From 
the outset, then, it had a serious ambition to contribute to our knowledge of cross-
cultural film reception.  Among our several means of gathering materials, we used a 
questionnaire whose results were fed into a searchable database.  The questionnaire 
combined quantitative (multiple-choice response and self-allocation scales, plus 
demographic information) with qualitative (free-text opportunities to explain the 
quantitative responses, along with questions about particular aspects of the film).  In 
all, just under 25,000 completed responses were received, in 14 languages.  In terms 
of scale of corpus, this was going to be complex to handle.  In terms of questions, we 
simply could not assume in advance what the film would mean to different people. 
 
I use one key investigation I undertook, to illustrate how we tried to secure 
trustworthiness.  A sequence of quantitative searches led us to identify a separation.  
Within the world set, we found that while the most common descriptor for the film 
was „epic‟, the one chosen by those most committed to the film was „spiritual 
journey‟.  These were among twelve options we had offered audiences (with the 
further possibility to nominate their own) to characterise their overall sense of the 
story.  A further set of quantitative explorations, using twelve countries with the 
highest overall rates of responses, found a complex patterning.  An inverse 
relationship emerged between the strength of separation between common and 
committed responses, and the proportion of repeat-readers of the books in the country.  
Indeed, in five countries with low proportions of repeat-readers, the „spiritual 
journey‟/„epic‟ vanished.  We therefore wanted to know (a) what these terms meant 
generally within the world set, and (b) how the separation of common vs committed 
choices worked within each country. 
 
The database allowed us to take random samples, and to gather together their answers 
to our first free-text question: „What did you think of the film?‟.  This had come 
immediately after we had asked people to tell us how much, on a five-point scale, 
they had enjoyed the film.  Those grouped answers, gathered in this fashion, now 
constituted our corpuses: 100 each from the world set of those who had nominated 
„epic‟, or „spiritual journey‟ (but excluding each other so as to minimise overlap)  
among their up-to-three terms to describe the story; then, 50 for twelve countries each 
from each of the most common choices and most committed choices (again, 
excluding each other).  Each corpus included examples ranging from one-word 
expressions of pleasure („Wow!‟, „Fantastic‟, and so on) to quite elaborated 
explanations of why and how people had enjoyed the film. 
 
If you would like to see the procedures in detail, they are available online.
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  In brief, 
the analysis involved: 
 a close reading of the two world sets, from which a coding scheme was developed 
that could encompass everything said;  
 producing formal definitions of the, in the end, ten codings;  
 the systematic application of these, ensuring they covered everything;  
 a first-level analysis of the codings to disclose similarities and differences both in 
frequencies, and in kinds of mention;  
 from these, an examination of how, within each corpus, elements were linked and 
moves made between kinds of talk, with the aim of disclosing discursive 
connectors. 
From these, a portrait of the typical elements was constructed and then tested against 
the most explicit and elaborated examples.  This stepped analysis was then repeated 
for the two sets from each of the twelve countries, in order to produce a portrait of 
their culture-specific patternings of choices.   
 
If you would like to see the outcomes in detail, they are published in the main book 
from the project.
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  What I believe we were able to achieve through this means, was a 
trustworthy account of two things: 
 
1. the different core meanings of The Lord of the Rings for those whose encounter 
with it was based deeply in the books, and their history; 
2. the ways in which these core meanings were altered by the local circumstances of 
the book/film‟s history and reception in some very different country-contexts. 
 
Although doing this was undoubtedly tough, I believe that this carefully ramified set 
of stages and procedures increases the trust that can be placed in our findings.  It also 
had the effect of revealing to us things that completely surprised us.  All this allowed 
us to go back to ask what could make sense of the peculiarities in responses in each 
country, and so not overlook what discourse analysis can easily suppose or take for 
granted. 
Summary: Key Points 
 
 The chapter traces the rise and spread of discourse theory and analysis, a 
multi-faceted development and one of the fastest growing areas of cultural 
theory and methodology. 
 It examines the ways it contains within many of its formulations complex 
claims about the responses of those on the receiving end of discursive forms 
and communications. The problems inherent in this are traced to the ways in 
which many formulations of „discourse‟ presume on particular models of 
„cultural power‟, which are in themselves antipathetic to the very notion of 
audience research. 
 The essay explores in detail a number of cases where such formulations are at 
work, within examples of discourse analyses of specific kinds of cultural 
materials, and explains why they may be problematic. 
 It offers as a way forward a series of methodological tests which can be 
applied to cases of discourse analysis, which could reduce the subjectivity and 
strengthen the trustworthiness of discourse analytic claims, and make them 
more open to empirical testing by reception research. 
 The essay very briefly introduces materials derived from the international 
Lord of the Rings audience research project, within which discourse analytic 
methods were used to examine responses to the film adaptation of Tolkien‟s 
books. 
 
 
 
Further Reading 
 
Discourse analysis is widely recognized as a wide-ranging set of approaches, deriving 
from competing paradigms and models.  A very good survey of the main approaches, 
at both theoretical and applied levels, is the pair of volumes edited by Margaret 
Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates: Discourse Theory and Practice, 
and Discourse and Data: A Guide for Analysis (both Milton Keynes: Open University 
Press, 2001). A range of journals carry important exemplars of the various kinds of 
work undertaken under the banner of discourse analysis, notably Text, Discourse and 
Society and Critical Discourse Studies.  These journals also contain important debates 
between practitioners within the various major „schools‟ of language and discourse 
work.  A range of audience researches have at various points claimed to use discourse 
analytic methods, not always very systematically.  Although written before the 
expression „discourse analysis‟ became popularised, Ien Ang‟s Watching Dallas: 
Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination (London: Methuen 1985) remains an 
important example of the critical examination of language to reveal social and cultural 
understandings.  Martin Barker and Kate Brooks‟ Knowing Audiences: Judge Dredd, 
its Friends, Fans and Foes (Luton: University of Luton Press 1997) contains an 
examination of various approaches, and outlines a set of procedures of an approach 
compatible with cultural studies‟ general audience research practices.  
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1
  See, as examples, Norman Fairclough (1992); Stef Slembrouck (2005); and Wetherell et al (2005). 
2
  Recently I have encountered two interesting variants.  „Positioning analysis‟, associated in particular 
with the work of Michael Bamberg, claims to find a mid-way between CA and CDA.  I do not yet feel 
confident enough to comment on this.  See, for instance, Korobov & Bamberg (2004). 
3
  It is necessary to say something about the relations of this critique to the long-running, and perhaps 
inevitably unfinished debate between two traditions of work on talk: conversation analysis, and critical 
discourse analysis.  In a series of often tetchy exchanges, scholars in the two camps have rehearsed 
arguments against each others‟ approaches.  It might appear at a quick glance that my argument sides 
me with the CA camp.  That would not be right at all.  I am very largely persuaded by the critique of 
CA offered by, for instance, Michael Billig.  In an exchange in Discourse and Society (Billig and 
Schlegoff (1999)), Billig argues that while CA presents itself as strictly empirical, concerned only with 
looking and seeing what are the organising characteristics of „ordinary conversations‟, in fact it is 
heavily based upon a „foundational rhetoric‟ which among other things presumes a working distinction 
between „ordinary conversations‟ and „official or institutional talk‟ – the former being presumed to be 
equal and participative, and thus not inflected by power-relations until specifically proved otherwise by 
formal qualities (such as imbalances in turn-taking).  Emanuel Schlegoff‟s cross response to this 
critique badly misses the point, I think because Schlegoff simply cannot accommodate the idea that 
research such as his necessarily involves theoretical commitments. But the problem is that my 
acceptance of Billig‟s critique hits a limit when he himself stops just there, with that acknowledgement 
of theory-tasks (“CDA aims to make explicit such tasks, in order to enable a theoretically based choice 
between available rhetorics and attendings/disattendings” (575)).  And it is clear that it is the question 
of „power‟ that is the heartland of the Billig/Schlegoff disagreement.  What Billig does not go on to do, 
is to consider how those commitments, and the findings which they thus prompt, might be tested.  
Without that, in the end, the CA/CDA choice is purely one of political preference. 
4
   I cannot in the space I have give as full an account of this book as it deserves. A much longer critical 
review of it is contained in Terry Threadgold‟s (2003) essay. 
5
   In fact I have chosen not to explore one essay (by Joan Pujol).  This is because the issues it raises are 
rather different, and would concern the sheer untraversable distance between her weighty theoretical 
framework deriving from Derrida and Ricoeur, and some hardly digested fragments of empirical 
material. 
6
   This distinction is derived from Edwards and Potter (1992).  In another essay, Willig has explored 
                                                                                                                                            
this distinction further. See her (1997) essay with Gillies. 
7
 See Eric Partridge (1986) for a fascinating collection of such catchphrases. 
8
   I have recently been using the marvellous online database LexisNexis to explore the evolution of 
references to „Gollum‟ before, during and after the appearance of the films of The Lord of the Rings.  
Methods of both analysis and presentation have posed real challenges.  It remains to be seen, by others, 
how successful I have been. 
9
   See for instance my IRIS essay, and From Antz to Titanic. 
10
   For a clear statement of the nature and importance of this circuit, see Paul du Gay et al., (1997).  
11
   Go to www.users.mib.aber.ac.uk  (Cross-Cultural Pleasures).  Not there yet! 
12
   Martin Barker & Ernest Mathis (2007). 
